Global environmental governance in the Anthropocene: breaking out of the enclosures? by Ford, Lucy & Kütting, Gabriella
1 
Global environmental governance in the  
Anthropocene: breaking out of the enclosures? 
 
Lucy Ford and Gabriela Kuetting 
 
 
Introduction   - setting the (Anthropo)cene 
 
Within the literature on the Anthropocene there are calls for a new kind of global stew-
ardship on planet Earth (Steffen et al, 2011). What would this look like? This chapter, 
written through the disciplinary lens of IR, reflects on the limitations of current global 
environmental governance, and how we might move forward. 
The Anthropocene has been hailed as a new geological epoch. This has been a controver-
sial claim. Continuities with the Holocene have meant that announcements of a new 
epoch are possibly premature and certainly contested. Indeed while the social sciences 
are busy taking up the concept of Anthropocene, the discipline of Geology has not yet 
embraced it officially (Anderson and Jones, forthcoming/this volume). 
 
Although humans have been around for 200,000 years, the Holocene of the last 11,500 
years is the geological period of stability in which humans have flourished, from pre-
historical, through feudal to the period of modernity — that historical period in which the 
enlightenment project broadened the questions of science as well as political philosophy, 
in which industrial revolution lead to expansion and development, and combined with the 
birth and development of capitalism and European colonial expansion created an ecologi-
cally unsustainable society that continued and expanded the social inequalities of feudal 
times, drawing the far corners of the globe into its own image and blueprint. While the 
geological epoch of the Holocene then is defined by its incredible stability that enabled 
life on planet Earth to flourish, the social, political and economic development during this 
time has been marked by incredible instability, flux and change, precipitating a conver-
gence of crises, if we think of the financial and economic crises, the energy crisis, the 
climate crisis, the extinction crisis, the biodiversity crisis, to name a few. Perhaps then 
these are the interlinked crises of the Anthropocene. 
 
Some of the key features of these crises are the contradictory tensions between sustaina-
bility and ecological renewal on the one hand and between the survival and flourishing of 
human society on the other; that is to say the tension between nature and society, between 
ecology and socio-political and cultural development. The study of these tensions is not 
new and certainly pre-dates the emergence of the concept of the Anthropocene. The last 
50 years have seen a host of authors such as Rachel Carson (1963) and E. F. Schumacher 
(1973) highlight these tensions and a global environmental movement has grown around 
trying to rectify these tensions. While mainstream solutions have continued to try to work 
within the current structures and institutions that have often focused on ‘end of pipe’ so-
lutions to these problems, classically defined as the ‘problem-solving approach’ (Cox, 
1981: 128-9), critical scholars have pointed out that the problem-solving approach in fact 
constitutes a political and economic enclosure that perpetuates these problems (Ford, 
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2005).  Critical scholars argue that the global economic crisis and global ecological  crisis 
are systematically interlinked, although not irreducible to each other, and that that inter-
linking takes place within the dominant economic model focussed on infinite economic 
growth on a finite planet  (Daly, 1996; Lohmann, 2009; Sullivan, 2009). Critical scholars, 
particularly those association with the journal Capitalism Nature Socialism and 
Ecological Economics, are pointing out that a finite planet will inevitably highlight the 
ecological contradictions of capitalist accumulation. Even mainstream epistemic commu-
nities highlighted the limits to growth in their report of 1972 (Meadows, 1972). Critical 
scholars maintain that if we are to resolve these crises and move towards a sustainable 
and socially just future, we will require a much deeper analysis of the enclosures, includ-
ing a fundamental re-evaluation of capitalism as a dominant economic and political form. 
 
The Anthropocene is trying to make a point about the ‘age of humans’  — the age where 
it has become clear that humans as the dominant species have altered nature — have 
caused anthropogenic changes with far reaching consequences, and it is humans who 
must set that right. Lewis and Maslin (2015) argue that inaugurating this new epoch of 
the Anthropocene will significantly transform the relationship between human society 
and planet Earth. This signaling of a ‘new’ geological era (with certain continuities) pro-
vides us with a space for reflection upon how humans ‘should’ take collective responsi-
bility for the damage wrought by human modernity. How do we create better structures 
for living life on this planet without destabilising the climate, destroying habitat (our own 
as well as that of millions of other species) and living together in peace? These are not 
novel questions, but ones that have been posed by philosophers and social scientists for 
generations. In this light, we ask, what should a global politics for sustainability and so-
cial justice look like? Does the Anthropocene provide us with an imperative, a new en-
lightenment era, where we take seriously the damage that has been done alongside en-
lightenment and progress for some, where we take seriously the real limitations of plane-
tary boundaries and work together to share Earth’s resources equitably while protecting a 
safe operating space for life on Earth to continue to flourish, including for humans. 
 
This chapter argues that in order to work out such a new programme we need to break out 
of the enclosures of modernity that have exacerbated the interlinked crises of the Anthro-
pocene. This is a broad, complex and interdisciplinary project. In the first section the pa-
per will intervene in the discourse and practice of global environmental politics, by cri-
tiquing dominant global environmental governance approaches. The second section will 
propose a more holistic, intersectional global political ecological approach. In the final 
section the paper then argues that strategies for moving forward include acknowledging 
the intersectional nature of crises, and making links between different movements and 
communities (for example development, human rights and environment), developing new 
intellectual spaces for interconnection to contribute to breaking out of the enclosures and 
building new frames for positive change. 
 
 
Orthodox Global Environmental Governance (GEG) and its limitations 
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Since the end of the Cold War the discipline of International Relations (IR) has seen 
some large scale conceptual transformations. While the early life of this relatively new 
discipline (born in 1919 after the end of the first World War) was overshadowed with a 
preoccupation of the politics of war and peace amongst nations, the 1990s and the end of 
the Cold War saw a flourishing of issues, concepts and theories that had hitherto been 
marginalised and indeed had been seen by many as irrelevant to the high art of global 
statecraft — issues like development, environment, gender or indeed questions of democ-
racy. Since the 1990s we have seen growth in the analysis of how nations might cooper-
ate globally to deal with pressing issues, such as environmental degradation, poverty or 
human rights abuses. Within International Relations (IR) a growing literature on global 
environmental politics (GEP), which has been predominantly focused on building re-
gimes and institutions for sustainable development, highlighting the games states play or 
the factors that matter in creating institutions, or the obstacles that need to be overcome in 
terms of rational actor models. The growing discourse of governance that emerged in the 
1990s has also been applied to the environment in the form of GEG. What distinguishes 
discourses of governance from previous international regime approaches is the emphasis 
on expanding the range of actors by including the role of global civil society (for example 
Young 1997), a development synonymous with the discourse of global governance in 
general (Commission on Global Governance, 1995). 
 
More recently, in the light of growing evidence of the dangers we face in breaching plan-
etary boundaries, a discourse of Earth Systems Governance has emerged, asking ques-
tions of how we might best deal with the interlinked crises across a broad range of issues 
while also paying attention to questions of equity, agency, legitimacy and accountability 
(Biermann and Pattberg, 2012). 
However, we argue here that any approaches that do not pay attention to the wider and 
deeper social structures that the governance structures are embedded in may fail to bring 
about the changes needed to put us onto a sustainable and just path within ever shrinking 
planetary boundaries. While much recent literature has been successful in introducing 
new policy mechanisms and incorporating a multi-actor approach (Biermann and 
Pattberg, 2012; Selin, 2012; Andonova, 2010; Young, King and Schroeder, 2008), it has 
not addressed the question of power and hierarchy in a genuinely critical way, skirting 
the question of who rules. 
 
The recognition of a more traditional pluralist world of actors was co-opted into main-
stream governance approaches. Transnational environmental movements and NGOs, as 
well as transnational corporations (TNCs), were seen as systemically relevant actors in 
global environmental politics (Princen and Finger, 1994; Wapner, 1996; Keck and Sik-
kink 1998). With this came the recognition of more complex webs of interdependence 
and a richer diversity of actors involved in policymaking (Lipschutz and Mayer, 1996; 
Paterson, Humphreys and Pettiford, 2003). However, at the core of the global governance 
approach is still the assertion that the best way to pursue wider normative goals is further 
institutionalization. This can be observed with all the major global institutions and their 
current processes, be it climate change, biodiversity or desertification among others. 
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Applying the concept of governance bumps up against at least three sorts of limitations. 
In the first place, in terms of agenda-setting and policy formulation, policy planning lack 
coherence. Expectations of concerted action, whether by interest groups, social move-
ments and NGOs, and state and intergovernmental actors, cannot be fulfilled. Policy ne-
gotiations limp along with space created for behind-the-scenes lobbying and regulatory 
arbitrage. Second, institutions themselves are fragmented; actors focus predominantly on 
inter- and intra-institutional games. Negotiations are concerned with endogenous institu-
tional and managerial (in)stability, coherence, and hierarchical issues, rather than with 
substantive policy challenges. Third, the results of negotiations or governance frame-
works are suboptimal, leading to lowest common denominator, often highly compro-
mised outcomes. Watered-down, ineffective agreements are presented as successes, while 
implementation and enforcement are left until further compromises—while interest group 
actors regroup and marshal their forces for the next round. 
 
Critical scholars point out how orthodox, problem-solving environmental governance, 
rather than being ecologically effective, is more concerned with institutional effective-
ness that might actually be stabilising and perpetuating world order (Paterson, 2000; 
Kuetting, 2000). If the international institutional architecture is embedded in a neo-liberal 
model that systematically produces socially unequal and environmentally destructive ac-
cumulation and growth, as Purdey (2010) argues, then finding solutions to these problems 
within these very institutions will prove ineffective, no matter how good the intentions.  
 
Rather, in line with critical theory, we need to understand and expose how environmental 
degradation is enclosed within global hegemony. Hegemony is understood in the neo-
Gramscian sense as the way that dominant power relations are maintained by consent 
predominantly, with the back up of coercion (Cox, 1981; Gill, 2003). We need to ques-
tion the very parameters of action, the very economic, political and socio-cultural struc-
tures that are perpetuating social injustice and ecological degradation (Saurin, 1995, Ford, 
2005, Parks, et al, 2008). 
 
In the aftermath of the Cold War and also at the time of the Rio Earth Summit The Ecol-
ogist magazine ran an article which employed the concept of enclosure to describe GEG. 
It ran as follows: ‘Enclosure redefines how the environment is managed, by whom and 
for whose benefit.  It inaugurates a new ecological order.  It defines power’ (The 
Ecologist, 1992:155). We believe and have argued elsewhere (Ford, 2005) that the con-
cept of enclosures is a powerful tool for describing and analysing the ways in which dom-
inant discourses and discursive practices become hegemonic in the neo-Gramscian sense 
of not necessarily being coercively enforced. GEG is enclosed within dominant economic 
discourse, which is rooted in capitalist, neo-classical economics that continues to focus 
on and prescribe economic growth and market based solutions to environmental prob-
lems. For example, the capture of the climate change debate at international level by the 
carbon markets approach has arguably delayed effective strategies and led international 
efforts up a blind alley (Newell, 2008). Further, as outlined above, GEG is politically en-
closed within global political structures that advocate institutionalist responses to global 
environmental degradation. These two enclosures — economic and political — although 
often seen as separate, in fact go hand in hand, and operate in tandem.  
5 
 
In general, the liberal and neoliberal institutionalist literature, including global govern-
ance, is relatively optimistic on the question of whether weaker actors can assert their 
rights and interests, and views systemic indicators for inequality in a less prominent light. 
Critical writers, whose main research focus tends to be aligned with environmental jus-
tice or structural issues, tend to be much more pessimistic, as in the consumption and the 
justice literatures. For example, there is a substantial and growing literature that addresses 
global warming/climate change in these contexts rather than in governance terms, arguing 
that the forces both enabling and preventing effective action are deeply embedded in ne-
oliberal capitalism and the assumption of the necessity of economic growth. 
There are two competing schools of economic thought on the environment and its rela-
tionship with global economic integration (Clapp, 2010; Clapp and Dauvergne, 2011). 
The economic mainstream sees economic growth as a potentially positive development 
for the environment. Based on an assumption of economic rationality, markets ought to 
be ideal tools for adjusting environmental problems through market instruments such as 
emissions trading, cap and trade, etc. Ecological economists on the other hand assume 
that with a finite resource base on the planet, economic growth cannot be physically and 
biologically sustainable and therefore cannot lead to lasting environmental improvement 
(Daly and Farly, 2003; Carmin and Agyeman, 2011). Ecological economists, in contrast, 
argue that the concept of the market itself is at the root of the problem. Some critics have 
also raised questions about the environmental impact of inequality (Martinez Alier, 
2002). However, it is generally uncontested that overconsumption in rich industrialized 
countries has increased resource use globally and led to ever higher levels of waste and 
environmental degradation. Likewise, overdependence on local resources in the form of a 
subsistence economy has also led to high levels of environmental degradation in many 
parts of the developing world, and the connections between these trends have become a 
primary concern for the study of global environmental policy (Okereke, 2008).  
 
As argued above, the economic and political enclosures are not separate, but intertwined 
and operate in concrete ways through dominant discourses, such as for example sustaina-
ble development.  Within this orthodox approach the concept of sustainable development 
has arguably become a central tool for promoting continued economic growth, despite the 
original emergence of the concept as an alternative. From this point of view international 
institutions for sustainability have often ended up being more of an empty ‘performance’ 
than being really designed to be effective levers for the transformation required (Bluh-
dorn, 2013). Although sustainable development continues to be a widely contested term, 
the orthodox view of sustainable economic development has been widely adopted within 
the global environmental management apparatus.  Through the concept of sustainable de-
velopment an appeasement has taken place between environment and development, and 
between global North and global South. Yet underneath it all what it has really meant is 
business as usual.  Sustainable development has been adopted by business which is pro-
fessing to be the champion of environmental protection and is leading to a privatisation of 
global environmental governance (Clapp, 2010). 
 
Where the study of politics and economics has been intertwined, for example in the area 
of International Political Economy within IR, orthodox approaches does for the most part 
6 
not challenge the separation of economics and politics and does not offer a satisfactory 
account of environmental degradation as embedded in social, economic and political rela-
tions. The concept of ‘limits’ demonstrates this diversity of problem definition (Meadows 
et al. 1972; Daly, 1996; Redclift, 1987, 1992; Merchant, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 1991, 
1999). The fundamental question of whether the finite nature of many of the world’s re-
sources needs to be overcome by cutting back on their usage or transcended through 
technological progress is deeply divisive, and there is little constructive critical engage-
ment between those who see technological change as offering limitless opportunities, and 
those who see the excessive use of finite resources (including air, water, atmosphere, etc.) 
as the root cause of environmental problems and regard technological solutions as a mere 
‘band aid’. The neoliberal economic order treats the natural environment as if there were 
an unlimited supply of natural resources, so with the right kind of technological innova-
tion and economic pricing tools, environmental problems will be overcome. Critical writ-
ers, on the other hand, focus on the structural problems of modern socio-economic and 
political systems and address issues of power and inequity which orthodox approaches 
outlined above eschew. In the next section we want to ask, then, what frameworks might 
help us better to understand the linkages and develop more effective strategies? 
 
Global political ecology as a framework for critique and pro-action 
 
The limitations above point to a need for a more holistic approach to the converging cri-
ses of the Anthropocene which breaks through the separations of disciplines as well as 
the separation of nature from society and the separation of bounded spheres of local and 
global, inside and outside or state, market and civil society.  
 
Situating ourselves in the critical camp, means moving beyond a problem-solving ap-
proach in the Coxian sense (1981) that takes given structures and institutions for granted.  
Critical green thought identifies the need for a fundamental transformation of modern so-
cio-political and economic structures and practices, requiring for example a decentralisa-
tion of state power, scaling down of economic activity and transformation of capitalist 
relations of production, a reclaiming of the commons and fighting enclosures (Paterson 
2001; Bookchin, 1980; Gorz ,1980). We further want to draw on the work of Converge, 
which highlights the importance of equity within planetary boundaries.  
 
Rather than focusing on world order we need to inquire into the social relations that ad-
vance and impede sustainability and social justice. These concepts are part of a battle 
over interpretations which have material consequences.  For example, the Brundtland 
Report claims to be building on the same two ideals of sustainability and social justice, or 
a particular appropriation of those terms as ‘sustainable development’ and ‘participation,' 
an interpretation which is pervasive within orthodoxy.  This interpretation, it is argued, is 
a fundamental part of the reproduction of hegemony. The challenge must take place in 
theory and practice, of challenging — or reclaiming — the orthodox interpretations as 
well as orthodox practices. A global political ecology approach is needed in both theory 
and practice as part of a project for radical social change. Such an approach needs to be 
able to analyse ecology as tied up with contemporary global hegemony. A broad body of 
literature on political ecology is bringing together insights from ecology and political 
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economy which is part of a much wider critical and diverse body of knowledge that deals 
with important questions regarding ecology and social relations in the late modern world. 
 
Further, green thought does not just stand alone as a body of abstract knowledge, but 
goes with a vibrant social movement, that is actively seeking to innovate and design per-
manent alternative systems. While dominant approaches focus on solutions delivered 
global institutions and actors, including states and market actors, we highlight the im-
portant role of social movements. How might they situate themselves so as to break 
through dominant political and economic enclosures? Our plea for a global political ecol-
ogy approach is addressed at institutions as well as outside forces. 
 
The key characteristics of a critical global political ecology approach need to pay atten-
tion to following aspects:  
 
 a.) Convergence - the recognition of planetary boundaries and the limitations 
this puts on our avenues and the recognition that this raises questions of equity — that the 
two benchmarks of social justice and sustainability go hand in hand. Convergence also 
pays attention to scale and the recognition of different scales. We identify the need to 
recognise the converging crises of the Anthropocene have their roots in a globalising he-
gemony and that this deep structure needs to be recognise and analysed (Maclean 1999), 
though not necessarily translated into only global response — the analysis needs to be 
global, though the practical action can take place on many different plains.  
 
b.) Giving ecology ontological status — this is the challenge of ecocentrism to anthropo-
centrism, which has remains central to both the economic and political enclosures. This 
second point is related to the first point, in that the recognition of planetary boundaries 
enables us to rethink safe carrying capacity for all life on Earth, and including for future 
generations of humans and other species. 
 
c.) Political ecology — the recognition that ecology and political economy both stem 
from the work oikos (household), a holistic understanding of the relations between socie-
ty, ecology and economy. The separation of economics and politics into discrete disci-
plines disables a holistic understanding of the interrelationships. For example, the study 
of political economy, including international political economy, has forgotten its ecologi-
cal roots and does not pay attention to the ecological structures that are integral to the po-
litical-economic processes (Bernard (1997); Polanyi1957). Likewise the study of poli-
tics/IR has focussed on politics and order/world order without paying attention to ecology 
and where it has, has not paid attention to economics (Lafferiere and Stott 1999). Ecology 
reminds is of the common root and the base — the material conditions for life on Earth at 
the heart of economics and politics. The material and the ethical are important parts of the 
story, neither of which can be left out. Bringing ecology back into political economy al-
lows us to discuss the nature of embeddedness and disembedding —  the way in which 
the economy becomes separated from society in the great transformation to the market 
society both materially and ideationally in that it changes social relations and reconceptu-
alizes nature as subordinate (Bernard 1997). A critical political ecology also helps us to 
recognise how ecology has falsely been identified as a commodity. Polanyi (1957) identi-
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fied land as a fictitious commodity because it is not produced by the market, just like la-
bour, and yet the separation of nature from society and the false identification as com-
modity has allowed nature to become commodified. The latest such fictitious commodity, 
for example, is carbon, which has given rise to a large market, but one which is ultimate-
ly unlikely to solve the ecological crisis. Being able to think about ecological limits also 
links back to Converge – the idea that there are ecological limits to the economy as well 
as to globalisation and the global political economy, i.e., the expansion of market society. 
An important part of the work, conceptually, then is the re-embedding of nature/ecology 
into political economy. 
 
d) Intersectionality: a radical critique and praxis would not be complete without attention 
to gender and feminist analysis, which brings in analysis of power relations and high-
lights the important notion of intersectionality (Kaijser and Kronsell 2014). Ecofeminists 
have long pointed out that IR and IPE, while providing a history of states and markets 
pay no attention to the violence committed against nature in the process (Tickner 1993). 
The great transformation not only about the ascent of market society but also marked by a 
particular form of scientific rationality that subordinated the body to the mind, nature to 
society, or women to men. Feminist theory at heart is an investigation into the workings 
of power, within social structures and human relations, as well as towards the non-human 
world. Ecofeminism argues that both the domination of humans over humans and humans 
over nature need to be overcome simultaneously if we are to achieve an ecological secure 
and socially just future. Need to build sustainable non-dominating relations with nature 
and amongst humans. Like overcoming the separation of economics and politics, inter-
sectionality calls for holistic analyses that pay attention to all power relations along race, 
class, gender lines. Feminism like ecologism is not just a theory, but a vibrant praxis. It is 
about both the content and process of social transformation. Theory and praxis cannot be 
separated. Feminism, amongst other critical approaches, asks the deep questions about 
where the power lies. Fundamentally, that power is not just manifested in concrete rela-
tionships and outcomes — these are also discursive practices and behind them is a dis-
course, which itself holds power and is culturally, socially, economically, politically em-
bedded. And can thus be dislodged. This is what progressive movements are about — 
have always been about. They are the stimulus and sometimes the agent of change. Radi-
cal political ecology is about challenging all discourses as well as institutional structures 
and practices.   
 
This is not to argue that institutional change is ineffective. We argue for a multi-pronged 
approach, working for social change within the global institutional architecture, as well 
building broader alliances with and amongst movements working outside official institu-
tional channels. This is in line with Convergence calls for paying attention to scale, struc-
ture, interconnection of sustainability and social justice. A lot of our hope is placed in the 
broader social movements working on the ground, outside of the global institutions, 
which must also be part of the debate, and where the challenge of enclosures also takes 
place. In discussing the role of social movements in global politics John Maclean once 
warned that if contemporary social movements do not recognise their own agency within 
the deep structure of hegemony, they may unintentionally reproduce that very hegemony 
(Maclean, 1999:4). A key part of the way forward, as outlined, is to recognise the global 
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enclosures and to find ways of disrupting and challenging them through critical discourse 
and practice. Amidst increasing calls for more democratic and deliberative forms of poli-
tics (Dryzek, 2010) a key way forward given the interlinked crises of the Anthropocene is 
to build bridges with diverse movements across issues, employing holistic analysis. 
 
We now turn our attention to an example of a movement that is tackling issues of sustain-
ability and social justice in a holistic way. This is, in our minds, an example of a radical 
political ecological movement that is challenging dominant structures. While some of its 
ideas may be too radical for mainstream consumption and thus action, it nevertheless 
provides an important challenge to dominant discourse and practices. And furthermore, it 
has already made some impact on the discourses of dominant institutions like the IMF 
and OECD. 
 
The Degrowth movement 
 
Within both the academy and amongst social movements, degrowth has emerged as a 
discourse which seeks to downsize production and consumption in order to rebalance na-
ture and society.  (McKibben 2007; Victor and Rosenbluth, 2007; Jackson, 2009, 
Kerschner, 2009, Latouche, 2009; Heinberg 2011). At heart it emerged out of ecological 
economics and the challenge to the dominant neoclassical economic focus on economic 
growth. Recognising the limitations of one-planet living and the very real ecological lim-
its including planetary boundaries, it argues that exponential economic growth is impos-
sible. It thus serves as a radical critique of dominant economic enclosures.  
A degrowth society according to Kallis, Kerschner and Martinez-Alier (2012) would be 
organised along the following principles: cap and share, zero interest rates, non-debt 
money and regional currencies, new forms of property and work-sharing. Such an ap-
proach is a radical critique of capitalist social relations as it seeks to remove the profit 
motive from the economy and reduce the emphasis on growth. In addition to this, there is 
a focus within this movement on well-being. Degrowth authors have argued that actually 
the focus on economic growth does not necessarily add to well-being, indeed it may actu-
ally detract from it (Victor and Rosenbluth 2007; Jackson, 2009). Given the current focus 
on economic growth and the measurement of well-being in terms of GDP, degrowth pre-
sents a radical challenge to the current capitalist, free market economy, and would require 
a substantial reordering of the economic and political system. 
 
Such a commitment to degrowth would radically challenge all the dominant political 
networks, alliances, systems and governance structures that are in existence today, be-
cause they are oriented around growth strategies (Purdey, 2010). Hence suggesting it as a 
policy tool would most likely receive not political support. However, there are some ex-
amples of inroads into dominant debates. For example, the German Energiewende (ener-
gy transformation) shows that under the right circumstances it is possible to challenge 
structural constraints and policy tools based on reducing material throughput — a corner 
stone of ecological economics and ultimately the main guiding principle of a degrowth 
society — are beginning to be possible proposals at local, national and indeed global lev-
els.   
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For example, the OECD has a program dedicated to measuring material flows and re-
search productivity which engages with the importance of measuring material through-
put. Material flow analysis (MFA) is accepted as an increasingly policy relevant and rap-
idly developing field of research, constituting a tool that can provide a more integrated 
and holistic measure of resource and material flows in the economy, from which econo-
my-wide material flow indicators can be derived, including on resource productivity and 
resource use efficiency. The OECD acknowledges that these could parallel labour 
productivity indicators (OECD, 2008).  
 
The OECD’s programme acknowledges the progress that has been made in developing 
MFA methodologies, not least thanks to international, multi-sectoral joint research efforts 
across the OECD region including governmental and non-governmental institutions, in-
cluding the EU institutions such as the European Environment Agency. MFA is now a 
policy making tool across the OECD. OECD countries that have developed national sets 
of environmental or sustainable development indicators are building on MFA tools and 
some of these countries are integrating MFA methodology into their national system of 
official statistics. Indeed, resource and material flows and related indicators now feature 
in the activities of most OECD countries (OECD, 2008). 
 
The World Bank, too, sees the limitations of a growth paradigm and argues for material 
throughputs to take a central place in economic reasoning. Like Victor and Rosenbluth 
(2007), the World Bank (2004: 115) argued that economic growth and wellbeing are not 
intrinsically connected: 
 
[P}reliminary estimates show that many of the most resource-dependent  
 countries, including all the major oil exporters, have low or negative  
genuine domestic savings. That means that losses of their national wealth  
 caused by depletion of natural capital and damage done by CO2   
 emissions outweigh the benefits from net domestic saving and education   
 expenditure. Thus it is quite possible that in these countries the  
aggregate national wealth was actually decreasing, to the detriment of   
 the people’s quality of life and these countries’ future development   
 prospects. And such unsustainable development might be happening in   
 spite of positive economic growth indicators, which are usually at the   
 center of all governments’ attention. 
 
The World Bank acknowledges that it has been common to assume that indicators of sus-
tainable development have a high substitutability among different components of a coun-
try’s wealth. For example, it might be assumed that the incomes derived from  depletion 
of natural resources could be invested in the building up of human capital, such as for 
example education, or physical capital, such as for example new enterprises. However, 
the World Bank argues that actually there needs also to be some reduction in energy and 
material throughput for the criteria of sustainable development to be met. So in actual 
fact, such ‘compensatory’ investments would also need to lead to investment in new 
technologies and the use of renewables rather than non-renewables for example, solar 
energy instead of oil. 
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Thus the recognition of degrowth, or at least a critical engagement with the concept of 
growth, is not a debate that takes place solely between ecological economists or critical 
political ecologists but it is also a debate that has squarely arrived in policy-making cen-
tres. However, it is unlikely that the very structures of capitalist global political economy 
will be challenged head on by organisations like the World Bank or OECD. This is where 
the focus on the movement working both inside the corridors of power as well as outside 
in society becomes paramount. Working inside to diffuse norms that run counter to the 
dominant ideologies that perpetuate environmental degradation and social injustice is a 
slow process and one that is likely to be met with significant resistance and which also 
runs the great danger of being watered down and co-opted. However, the challenge also 
takes place outside of the dominant institutions within society, within grassroots move-
ments campaigning for de-growth strategies, amongst others, societal forces working on 
the ground to transform the economy and society to pay attention to convergence — that 
is to the linked issues of social justice and ecological sustainability and renewal within 
planetary boundaries, as well as to paying attention to the question of scale and the rela-
tionship between the local and the global, as seen for example in the very real power of 
global institutions to set global policies that need to be challenged at global as well as lo-
cal levels. At least the de-growth’s underlying assumptions are ecocentric, which is to put 
humans back in their place as being part of nature, rather than separate from it. Key eco-
logical economic and political economic principles are built into this movement. Intersec-
tionality seeks to break down the question of social justice to look at the deeper relations 
of power, paying attention to race, class and gender and how these play out within socie-
ty. These are key issues that must also be at the heart of the de-growth movement. The 
de-growth movement is a broad movement and within it has paid attention to feminist 
issues, for example in looking at fair distribution within care work (D’Alisa et al, 2015). 
This is a growing and diverse movement, posing important challenges to core political, 
economic and social principles upon which our currently unsustainable societies are 
based on. It is thus fundamentally a movement of the Anthropocene. 
  
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has argued that if there is anything new about the Anthropocene, it is that we 
are faced with a convergence of crises. And while this realisation is not new, indeed, 
scholars have sought to highlight many of these crises for decades, perhaps we have ar-
rived at a critical point in time, where the stability of our climatic conditions for a thriv-
ing Earth can no longer be denied, and this helps to focus the mind. We also argued that 
while the Holocene has provided well for humans and other species in terms of climatic 
stability, the same cannot be said for social conditions on Earth, where the dominant 
mode has been conflict, flux and change. Whether the arrival of the Anthropocene may 
not immediately help humans to overcome their enmity with nature and with each other, 
we nevertheless find that a critical political ecological approach helps us to identify some 
of the limitations of the past. The paper outlined the dominant approaches within one par-
ticular academic discipline, that of IR, which is the natural homeland for the study of 
GEG. We sought to show how dominant economic and political frames form powerful 
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enclosures on the solutions proffered to global environmental problems, where neoliberal 
market based and institutional solutions dominate. Instead, we made a plea for a more 
holistic approach that pays attention to limits and planetary boundaries as well as ques-
tions of justice, that addresses questions of scale and seeks to overcome conceptual and 
disciplinary separations that have at heart a separation of humans and nature and within 
that to pay attention also to the power relations amongst humans and between humans 
and nature. We applied this to one promising case study of the de-growth movement, 
which seeks to recognise the limitations of current economic models, while not compro-
mising on human well-being, but rather recasting well-being in a more holistic light, 
something that is perhaps central to our future survival through the Anthropocene. 
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